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A B S T R A C T
The search for the elusive "cu ltura l un ive rsa l s” in a var ie ty  of academic 
disciplines has been motivated b y  the spectre of relativism in its d iverse  
gu ise s.  The problem of relativism has been th ru s t  upon us inter alia by  
the inability of our epistemological models to account for social and 
cultural,  moral and cognit ive d ive rs i ty  and to p rov ide us with cr iteria 
b y  means of which to judge aberrat ions like ideologies.
Contra ry  to the general trend I would like to argue  that it is not the 
spectre of relativism in its var ious  gu ise s  which necessitates the search 
for cultural un ive rsa ls,  nor is th is  the on ly  motivation for  a Chr ist ian  
to argue in favour of the recognition of cultural un ive rsa ls.  Various 
authors have suggested  that such un iversa l s tructu res  do exist; that 
they condition human and societal behav iour and that it would in principle 
be possible to construct  a theory  of these structural un ive rsa ls  or a 
"b iogrammar" or "g e o g r a p h y ” of the universal cultural acquisition device 
of humankind (cf. Harre,1976, 32; Johnson, 1987: x x xv i i ;  T ig e r  and 
Fox, 1974:17,30). C ro s s -cu ltu ra l  research in both p sycho logy  and 
anthropology has pointed to the existence of such traits, and in recent 
philosophical d iscuss ions  Apel and others have pointed to the necessity 
of recognizing the existence of some sort  of " t ranscendenta l ia ".
These arguments emphasize elements that are common to d iverse  
approaches to the problem of cultural un ive rsa ls.  Chr ist ian  scho lars  could 
accept most of these arguments as valid and yet argue  in favour  of a 
v e ry  specifically modified vers ion of the notion of cultural un iversa ls.  
Th is  e ssay  attempts to develop such a position.
The argument in favour of the necess ity of the recognition of the cultural 
un iversa ls  b y  Chr ist ian s,  will be developed from two different angles: 
Koers 54(1) 1989 . 74.
The f i r s t  argument will depart from an account of the nature of metaphor. 
The  second argument will be a defence of the position that a Chr ist ian  
account of the structu res  assumed as basic to all human categorization 
and classif ication of the world, will confessionally link these s t ructures  
with G od 's  Word for reality.
1. T H E  N A T U R E  OF M E T A P H O R
Metaphors and un iversa ls
Metaphor, conceived as a pervas ive  mode of understand ing  and one of 
the main cognit ive  s tructures  by  which we are able to have coherent, 
ordered experiences, necessitates an account of the basic conditions of 
human experience, meaning, and knowledge formation in which the 
existence of cultural un iversa ls  is recognized. A  view in which there 
is recognition of the fact that the under ly ing  classif icatory system on 
which metaphorical reference is based represents more than a 
sociologically determined semantic reality, requires a theory of un iversa ls  
which prov ides  an account of the "g ro u n d in g "  of categories and 
classif ications in the universal, cultural experience of human beings. 
All human experience is conditioned b y  such preconceptual and 
pre l ingu ist ic  basic level categories and the recognition of the existence 
of such categories is necessitated b y  the following four arguments:
• The  mere possib i l ity  of c ross-cu ltu ra l  communication,
• the phenomenon of so r t -c ro s s in g ,  category mistakes and semantic 
conflation,
• a "rea l i s t "  interpretation of scientific theorizing, and
• the "metaphorical" nature of human understanding, cognition and 
experience.
These  arguments are incorporated in one central thesis which has as its 
focal point the g roun d ing  of the cognit ive meaning of metaphors in human 
experience. Th is,  I believe, will p rov ide evidence for the necessity of 
the recognition of the existence of un iversa ls.
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Th is  argument is developed in opposition to traditional Objectivist  (as
succinctly formulated by Bernstein, 1983; J ohn son , 1987) so-called
God s - e y e "  v iew s  of m eaning.  I want to a r g u e  fo r  the  recogn it ion  of
the existence of cultural un iversa ls,  but I do not interpret them in the
traditional objectivist sense as standing outside human experience or over
and against the subjective "m ir ro r in g "  activity of the human mind 
t i
( R o r t y , 1980). Such an approach forces one into the uncomfortable 
position of claiming to be able to determine when subjective 
representations adequately represent objective reality - a feat which 
cannot be accomplished.
A ve ry  specific modified notion of "u n iv e r sa l s "  is at stake here, one that 
differs considerably from the traditional Aristotelian, so-called "absolute" 
theory of u n ive rsa l s . 1 I shall adumbrate this modified notion of 
"u n ive r sa l s "  briefly by d is cu s s in g  Hesse and Harts views.
Hesse develops an anti-realist  position concern ing un iversa ls.  She rejects 
the "absolute theory " of un iversa ls,  which she claims to have evaded (or 
so lved?) by the development of an alternative to the traditional view of 
un iversa ls,  based on a vers ion of Wittgenstein s "family resemblance" 
view. In opposition to traditional views of metaphor, which resorted to 
some g round ing  in natural k inds  o r  un iversa ls  to which language is 
related, Hesse "ancho rs "  metaphorical reference in the semantic network 
of the language. She rejects the Aristotelian theory of un iversals  (which 
she calls the "absolute theory ")  which views metaphor as the transposit ion 
of a name that p roperly  belongs to something else (Hesse, 1984:28) and 
resorts  to Wittgenstein’s notion of "family resemblances" and to the 
conventional nature of judgements concern ing similarities and differences 
as an alternative. The  "family resemblance" account of un iversa ls  implies 
that no meanings are univocal, she argues. The rules under ly ing  the 
correct applications of meanings and under ly ing  meaning relations must 
be sought. In her (Hesse, 1985/6) exposition of an intentional view of 
meaning and an alternative to the traditional view of metaphor which 
resorted to some g round ing  in natural k inds o r  un ive rsa ls  to which
Th is  argument has been developed extensively  in Botha, 1986.
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language is related, she anchors metaphorical reference in the semantic 
network of language in which classifications and categories grow through 
"experience" and "commerce with the world". In her exposition of the 
family resemblances and the way in which the recognition and learning 
of these resemblances take place she appeals to notions such as "the same 
expe r ience .. . " ,  "shared  assumptions", "the same phy s io logy ",  "the same 
cultural expectations", " irreducib le  perceptions" that are a function of 
"ou r  phys io logy  and its commerce with the world". In spite of her 
recognition of these "objective realities" to which language is related she 
opts for a moderately realist position. Her motivation is clearly the fact 
that our knowledge of these objective realities is limited, seldom definitive 
and always open to correction. By  and large this is an assumption usually 
shared by anti-realist  th inkers, yet it would be possible to subscr ibe  to 
this same fact and still be sympathetic to a realist position. McMullin 
(1984: 35) e . g . ,  maintains such a position.
To the question how we would know what we are talking about when 
confronted with the instability of meaning found in language in general, 
she says: "Members of a class are not identical realizations of an 
ontologically backed class-term, they are loosely grouped  by relations of 
similarity and difference into fuzzy, overlapping  and temporarily  defined 
classes whose boundaries change with experience and cultural convention" 
(1985/6:7; 1976: 8). She claims that in spite of the instability of meaning 
in language and the absence of un iversa ls,  communication is still possible, 
because much of the experience and convention is in common - these 
shared assumptions indeed constitute a language community. Learn ing 
and recognition of terms re ferr ing to certain states of affairs come about 
by a web of similarities and differences - irreducible perceptions - which 
are simply the "function of our physio logy  and its commerce with the 
world" (1985/6:8). She  says  : " ... s imilarity’ and difference" are not 
themselves un ive rsa ls,  because there are no un iversa ls.  So they must 
be judgments made on particular occasions by particular perceiv ing 
be ings ".  Th is  leads her in the direction of an anti-realist  position, which 
she characterizes as "moderate realism".
To my mind the recognition of the flu idity of language and semantic 
change which, for example, moves Hesse to argue  against the traditional 
notion of un iversa ls  does not warrant the conclusion that there are no
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(contextual) conditions for predication and denomination, other than those 
imposed by the f luctuating semantic network of the language or  mere 
social conventions. Semantic change and the possib il ity to recognize it 
is conditioned by more than semantic realities. Hesse seems to be aware 
of this fact when she points to the irreducible primary relations of 
difference and similarity. Moreover, these irreducible primary relations 
seem to be contextually  determined.
Hart 's  (1984) formulation of the problem of the un iversals  is helpful in 
this respect. He argues  that the "u n iv e r sa l s "  should not be interpreted 
as universal entities that are instantiated and exemplified, but as 
structural conditions for the existence of empirical reality. These 
structural conditions are the bases of the irreducible primary relations 
such as similarity and difference in reality and also provide the bases 
for the possib il ity of linguist ic predication and denomination. Each 
particular entity in our world has both indiv idual and universal traits 
which are characteristic of all of its existence (Hart, 1984: 18). In his 
ontology of un iversa l ity  Hart (1984) a rgues  that the un ive rsa l ity  of the 
universals  may point to something nomic, i.e. that all the var ious  
concepts used in talk ing about un ive rsa ls  have in common that particulars  
must relate to them in a certain way if they are to be the particulars  they 
are (Hart, 1984: 35). Concepts are therefore l inguist ic express ions  of 
o n e s  understand ing  of individual and particular existents. These are 
recognized as belonging to certain categories or g roup s  on the basis  of 
(prescientific o r  scientific) experiential knowledge. The conditions are 
not on ly  characteristic of reality, but also provide the basis  for the 
general modes of experience which warrant stability and the possib il ity 
of change.
A modified notion of un iversa ls  p rov ides  a different avenue to approach 
the problem of the existence of cultural un ive rsa ls.  Th is  approach with 
its appeal to nomic conditions that point to the fact that metaphorical 
reference is anchored in more-than-semantic-reality is of course  still 
confronted with the question concern ing the proof of the existence of 
these nomic conditions. It could be argued that we still have no other 
access to these conditions than the l inguist ic conventions of our own 
culture. When confronted with this challenge, var ious  avenues present 
themselves as possible answers: One is a "retreat to commitment", i.e.
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that one claims to believe that such conditions do exist. The other is an 
appeal to experience, which could be evidentially supported by scientific 
research. Obv ious ly  these approaches need not be mutually exclusive. 
From the phenomenon of c ross-cultura l communication another strong a r ­
gument in favour of the recognition of cultural un iversa ls  can be derived.
C ro s s -cu ltu ra l  communication
C ro s s -cu ltu ra l  communication of even the most trivial and elementary 
nature p resupposes  common standards of rationality, albeit on ly the 
common acceptance of rules of inference and logic; moreover, 
communicaton itself presupposes that core cr iteria like t ruth and validity 
are not context-dependent and variable, but un iversa l and fundamental 
(Lukes,  1970: 208; Jarvie, 1975: 351). Lukes (1970: 209 210 ) points to 
the fact that the existence of a common reality" is a necessary 
precondition for our understanding of a fore ign language and that there 
should at least be some clarity concern ing  the basic distinction between 
truth and falsity before any attempt at understand ing  and translation 
could be made. It follows that a foreign language must minimally possess  
criteria of t ru th (a s  correspondence to reality) and logic, which we share 
with it and which are simply criteria of rationality.
To understand  the utterances of an alien culture with a radically different 
language, we need to be able to relate these utterances to the world. 
Th is  requires a "b r idgehead " with the radically different culture which 
at least assumes that perception of everyday  objects is the same in both 
cultures and that the manner in which predication and denomination of 
these distinct objects would take place would be similar to the one used 
in ou r  own culture. This  bridgehead would imply that even though we 
don t understand  the foreign language, we assume that t ry in g  to conceive 
of a cu lture with a language which did not have conceptions of negation, 
identity and non-contradiction is an ab su rd ity  (cf. Lukes, 1970; Hollis, 
1970; Nielsen, 1974).
So r t - c ro s s in g  and category mistakes
An adequate theory of metaphor must g ive  account of the basic domains 
of experience and their interrelationship, but will also have to explain
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the basis for the distinction between inherent and interactive properties 
which function in the definition of concepts and metaphorical language 
use. Literal meaning is as much context-bound as metaphorical meaning, 
although the context is generally so much part of ou r  background  beliefs 
that we fail to recognize it as context (Kittay, 1987:97). Such a 
differentiation at least requires some guidelines for the identification of 
contexts and the determination of "improper" con text-c ross ing  (sort 
c ro s s in g )  or context mistakes (category mistakes). Not only do these 
experiential contexts guide and condition ou r  eve ryday  experience of 
reality and make it possible to identify e rrors  and mistakes, but the 
articulation of these contexts in a philosophical ontology provides a 
framework for the determination of semantic conflation (Sp ragens,  
1973:41) in scientific concept formation - in order to avoid becoming the 
victims of a situation in theorizing when "metaphors becomes m yths" 
(Turbayne, 1970:28). Such a framework can not be provided when 
metaphors are only anchored in the fluctuating semantic network of 
language. Th is  argument is based on the assumption that the world 
commonly shared by d ive rse  cultures has a un iversal and commonly 
recognizable s tructure  which presents itself to the partic ipants of d ive rse  
cultures in a common way. Th is  causal structure  of the world or the 
"jo ints" (Boyd, 1980:408), can be approximated in d ive rse  cultural 
la nguage s .
This  argument in favour of cultural un iversals  is not motivated by the 
imperative to establish a correspondence between culturally  localized 
beliefs and opinions and alleged culturally transcendental answers (cf. 
Jarvie, 1975: 347), but to a rgue  that human experience and knowledge 
is un ive rsa l ly  conditioned by the same basic structural g ivens.
Metaphorical models in scientific theorizing
I wish to a rgue  that both the irreducible primary relations of similarity 
and difference and their contextual qualif ications are s tructura l realities 
or "ontological constants"  (Levy,  1981: 31) which are approximated in 
theorizing b y  hypothetico-structura l explanation (McMullin, 1978: 139). 
In the approximation of these s tructures  (also formulated as "functional 
analogies" (H a r t , 1984)) or "necessa ry  metaphors" (Snell, 1953) found in 
reality, metaphors play a constitutive role. Successfu l scientific 
theorizing in which metaphorical models play a constitutive role and which
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lead to the p ro g re ss ive  uncover ing  of the causal features of the world, 
point to the fact that at least certain types of metaphorical constructions 
are based on unavoidable analogical states of affairs in reality which must 
be common to d ive rse  cultures; otherwise scientific communication across 
language and cultural barr ie rs  would not be poss ib le . 2 
Conceptual problem-so lving is an essential dimension of scientific 
rationality. Metaphor leads to concept reformulation (Rothbart, 1984: 
611 ) . 3 Concept formation takes place around members of a domain sha r ing  
some prominent features with some prototype members. Th is  leads to a 
contextual classification of objects. Metaphoric projection reorganizes the 
semantic field b y  introducing new saliencies into the field by h igh light ing  
some features and eliminating others. T h i s  leads to the formulation of 
new attributes that can be directly beneficial when a conventional field 
of concepts fails to permit certain desirable features to emerge. Assum ing  
that a conceptual problem is some weakness within the system of concepts, 
the gain from metaphor is expansion of the range of possible features 
attributable to the subject. Th is  leads to a displacement of concepts 
( S c h ó n ,19G3).
Conceptual novelty which provides  some epistemic access to hitherto 
unknown domains and to successfu l s t ructure  mapping, is an articulation 
of a whole series of expectations about the manner in which certain 
aspects of the world do behave or function. The systems, objects or 
items covered by  a certain new concept share overlapp ing  similarities. 
In the case of scientific concept formation these "family resemblances"
"Localized mathematics, localized science and localized morality are 
simply not mathematics, science and morality in the sense we intend 
and to which we asp ire " (Jarvie, 1975: 347).
So sk ice 's  (1985:102) distinction between "theory-const itu t ive " 
metaphors, i.e. metaphors which propose a model, and metaphors 
which are linguist ic projections of such a model, is helpful in this 
respect. In order to differentiate the two types of metaphors, she 
s ugg e s t s  a useful distinction between "theory-const itu t ive  metaphors" 
and "metaphorically constituted theory terms" (1985: 102).
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are most p r o b a b ly  in s ta nce s  of " func t iona l  an a lo g ie s "  (H a r t ,  1984) wh ich  
point  to b a s ic  and u n d e r l y i n g  onto logica l ana log ie s .  In the  approx im at ion  
of these  funct iona l ana log ie s  sc ien t i f ic  imag inat ion  is the veh ic le  fo r  the 
creat ive  o p e n in g  up  of novel in s i g h t s  into  the  s t r u c t u r e  of the  w or ld  and  
also for  the  gene ra t ion  of new m ean ing;  m ean ing  wh ich  often is not 
a l read y  con ta ined  w ith in  the semantic n e tw ork  of  the  la nguag e  s y s te m s  
util ized to concep tua l ly  formulate  the ant ic ipated  s im ila r it ies.  E v id e n ce  
from v a r iou s  d i s c ip l in e s  and from human e x p e r ie n c e  in gene ra l  po in t s  to 
the fact that  human expe r ience  and human cogn it io n  are mediated by  
p reconcep tua l  im age-schem at ic  s t r u c t u r e s  ( J o h n so n ,  1987) of an analogica l 
and metaphorical natu re ,  which  are a p p a re n t l y  common to d i v e r s e  c u l t u r e s  
in sp ite  of l in g u i s t ic  d i v e r s i t y .
M etapho rs  and  e xpe r ience
M etaphor  r e p re se n t s  a new way of see in g  o r  a new con tex t  w h ich  
g e n e ra l l y  is the  r e su l t  of the interaction  between at least two dom ains  
o r  con texts .  T h e se  " d o m a in s '  and semantic  f ie ld s  cannot  be imputed 
pu re ly  to social and cu l tu ra l  c o n v e n t io n s  ref lected in l in g u i s t i c  u sage  bu t  
the m ean ing  of the m e ta p h o r - in - c o n te x t  is c o n s t r a in e d  b y  s t r u c t u r e s  of 
expe r ience  w h ich  in t u rn  are  limited b y  the b o u n d a r y  c o nd it ion s  set b y  
the s t r u c t u re  of rea l ity  which  cond it ion s  human expe r ience .
Th i s  means that metaphorical concep ts  have  expe r ien t ia l  g r o u n d i n g  in 
ba sic  dom ains  of expe r ience  wh ich  are concep tua l ized  a s  e xpe r ien t ia l ly  
ba s ic  ge s ta l t s .  T h e y  are  the p r o d u c t s  o f  human n a t u re  and  form m u lt i ­
d imensional s t r u c t u ra l  wholes ( L a ko f f  and J o h n so n ,  1980:19, 117, 118; 
1982:193 f f ) .  T h e  concep ts  formed to e x p r e s s  these  e xpe r ie n ce s  refe r  
p a r t ly  to in h e re n t  and  p a r t l y  to in te rac t ive  p ro p e r t ie s .  T h e s e  k in d s  of 
e xp e r ie n ce s  o r  expe r ien t ia l  g e s ta l t s  a re  natura l  in the  s e n se  that they  
are the p r o d u c t s  of hum an  nature ,  and form m u lt i -d im ens iona l  s t r u c t u ra l  
wholes.  Some may be u n iv e r s a l ,  while  o th e r s  will v a r y  from cu l tu re  
to cu l tu re .  T h e  t y p e s  of e xpe r ie n ce  a n a ly sed  b y  Lakof f  and  J o h n so n  
inc lude,  in te r  alia, spat ia l ,  phy s io lo g ic a l ,  p s y c h o lo g ic a l ,  mental,  socia l,  
political, economic  and  re l ig iou s  e xpe r ience s .  T h e y  s u g g e s t  that  the 
concepts  w h ich  appear  in metaphorical d e f in i t io n s  a re  those  that 
c o r re sp o n d  to these  natura l  k in d s  of e xpe r ience .  J o h n so n  (1987:30 )  has  
elaborated these  i n s i g h t s  b y  a r g u i n g  that m ean ing ,  u n d e r s t a n d in g  and
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rationality are constrained by non-propositional "image-schematic ' 
s t ructures  such as for example temporal and spatial orientation which 
arise from our bodily experience and which are metaphorically projected 
and extended in order for us to understand reality.
Metaphors: More than semantic reality
The literature on metaphor abounds with publications concern ing the 
interrelationship between analogy and metaphor. In the classic theory 
of metaphor there was always a reticence to equate metaphor with what 
was regarded as "p rope r  ana logy" (Burre l,  1973: 260). Ample reference 
to and evidence of the fact that some metaphors are actually more 
"n ece s sa ry "  than others (O r t o n y , 1975: 45-53) is found in literature on 
metaphor. "Nece ssa ry  metaphors" (Snell) differ from metaphors found 
in everyday  language and also from those used in poetry, scientific 
explanation and in religious contexts. They also differ from other 
semantic peculiarities such as idioms and f igures  of speech. They  point 
to specific types of analogical relationships that are of such a nature that 
they cannot be ignored; that they have to be acknowledged. A s  such 
they are presupposed by  all the other above-mentioned types of 
metaphors . 11 In both everyday  knowledge and science it is not possible 
to rid ourse lves of the analogical or metaphorical usages which might be 
called functional metaphors (H a r t , 1984:156) or ontological "metaphors". 
Th is  means that a distinction has to be made between metaphors as 
ontological "metaphors" (unavoidable analogical s t ructures  (Hart, 
1984:156) or proper analogies and their l inguist ic elaboration.
Edie (1975: 39) too, refers to the distinction between epiphors and 
diaphors, and a rgues  that d iaphors are more fundamental, root, and 
"n ece s sa ry "  metaphors which are frequently  not recognized metaphors 
at all because of their absolute fundamental function of o rgan iz ing  
experience.
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These metaphors, which refer to the fundamental o r  ontological5 analogies 
found in reality, d ist ingu ish  themselves from other metaphorical usage 
in the sense that they designate actual states of a f fa i r s .6
2. C U L T U R A L  U N IV E R S A L S :  A C H R I S T IA N  IM P E R A T IV E ?
The final question which needs to be addressed is whether the recogniton 
of the above-mentioned states of affairs in any way prov ides  compelling 
evidence for the fact that a Chr ist ian ought to render a "rea l is t "  account 
of cultural un ive rsa ls  and to what extent such a position would be a more 
theoretically obedient notion than, for example, nominalist, idealist or 
sociological accounts. Th is  question can partially be answered by 
summarizing the main points of the argument developed in this essay:
• The existence of reality and human experience of the world is 
conditioned by  structural conditions which warrant both stability and 
the possib i l ity  of change.
• C ro ss -cu ltu ra l  experience and communication points to the fact that 
such a "b r idgehead "  exists which at least makes rational and logical 
communication on the basis of the norms of logic possible. These 
ultimate g round s  for the distinction between truth and falsity are 
obv ious ly  more than only conventional in nature. The Chr ist ian 
would advance the confession that these bases are God-g iven  criteria, 
which transcend conventions.
s It would be more accurate to refer to "ont ic "  o r  "ontical" in this 
respect.
‘ Ricoeur (1976: 59) refers to something similar when he requires a 
fundamental distinction between metaphor and symbol. He writes that 
"Metaphor occurs in the already purif ied un ive rse  of the logos, while 
the symbol hesitates on the d iv id ing  line between bios and logos. 
It testifies to the primordial rootedness of D iscourse  in Life".
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• It is exactly these structural g iven s  which provide the guidelines for 
determining mistakes and the possibilities of semantic conflation.
Faith in God, who has created an orderly  un ive rse  and who maintains it 
through  His law-Word, necessitates the recognition that human experience 
takes place within the framework of conditions which s t ructure  it and 
which are not only the product of social and historical factors, nor only 
the result  of linguist ic conventions.
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